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Twenty years of our gathering for the Fordham International 
Intellectual Property Conference have seen the United States patent 
regime transition from a Golden to a Silver Age.  During the 
inaugural 1992 conference, the United States stubbornly persisted 
 
  Professor of Law, Georgetown University. 
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in idiosyncratic practicesnotably a first-to-invent priority 
system1 and a seventeen-year patent term.2  Still a relatively new 
institution, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) had reached its maturity and accepted laudatory remarks 
from the Supreme Court.3  Observers trumpeted the high rate of 
filing at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) as a point 
of pride, with emphasis placed upon the fact that more than half of 
all patents were issued to U.S. citizens.4  And the patent 
community remained a small, guild-like order of attorneys and 
agents. 
Circumstances have changed considerably today.  Two decades 
later, the United States to a large extent has fallen in line with the 
fundamental precepts of the international patent order.5  Courts of 
review have, at notable times, critically received the judgments of 
the Federal Circuit.6  Unimaginably high filing rates at the USPTO 
have become a source of alarm,7 with more than half of all patents 
now being issued to foreigners.8  The patent community has 
become far more fractured, with many observers holding diverse 
perspectives on the effectiveness and moral worth of the patent 
system. 
Yet reason for tremendous optimism persists.  The U.S. patent 
laws have nurtured an extraordinary array of technologies that 
 
 1 See Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The 
Quest for World Patent Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 388. 
 2 See id. at 383. 
 3 See Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) 
(leaving refinement of the doctrine of equivalents to the Federal Circuit’s “sound 
judgment in this area of its special expertise”). 
 4 Laurence M. Rausch, U.S. Inventors Patent Technologies Around the World, NAT’L 
SCI. FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF (Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/ 
issuebrf/sib99329.htm. 
 5 Hasson, supra note 1, at 388 (noting that “the United States . . . has done its part to 
implement to goals of TRIPs effectively. . . . [and] has displayed its willingness to alter 
its domestic legislation in order to serve global and domestic goals.”). 
 6 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (noting “flaws in the 
analysis of the Court of Appeals” with respect to nonobviousness). 
 7 See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 746 
(2012) (noting that the USPTO is “overwhelmed with work”). 
 8 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2012, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last 
visited Sept. 12. 2012). 
C06_THOMAS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:26 PM 
2013] U.S. PATENT LAW 1992–2012 527 
would have been hard to perceive in 1992.  New voices have, to a 
great extent, confirmed the inherent values of the U.S. patent 
system even as they challenge insiders to make it operate more 
justly and efficiently.  The U.S. patent system, once archaic and 
hidebound, has again become an innovator.  Reflecting upon the 
previous twenty years, and considering what the next two decades 
might hold, is the task of this essay. 
I. THE END OF THE GOLDEN AGE 
In the late 1970s, patent system reform was viewed as a way 
for the United States to advance out of the economic malaise in 
which the nation found itself.  An antidote to a perceived “crisis of 
confidence” was the revitalization of the patent system through 
such mechanisms as the creation of the Federal Circuit9 and the 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman10 and Bayh-Dole Acts.11  The 
resulting Golden Age of Patents—which might be even more 
colorfully referenced as the “Steroids Era”12—led to an expansion 
of the scope of protection, the range of protectable subject matter, 
and the severity of damages imposed against adjudicated 
infringers. 
As the past two decades progressed, observers increasingly 
came to believe that the U.S. patent system had gone too far.  As 
Justice Breyer would note, “even when patents encourage 
innovation and disclosure, ‘too much patent protection can impede 
rather than promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”13  Reports 
from the National Academies,14 Federal Trade Commission,15 and 
 
 9 See Alfred J. Mangels, The Quiet Revolution in Patents, 13 VA. BUS. ASS’N J. 4, 5 
(1987).  
 10 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
 11 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. 
 12 See Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 387, 390 (2011) (referring to the patent system as “a property regime on 
steroids.”). 
 13 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from dismissal of certiorari)). 
 14 See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY (Stephen 
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004). 
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economists16 contributed to a chorus of concerns that ultimately 
echoed in the halls of Carlyle, Capitol Hill, and Madison Place, 
and led to significant changes in attitude and doctrines.  The ability 
of the patent system to adapt to the changing needs of the 
innovative community over the past two decades provides potent 
testimony to the self-correcting capabilities of the common law.  
This gradual shift in the ethos of the U.S. patent system was 
punctuated by several defining moments that are discussed next. 
A. Legislative Reform 
In recent years some commentators have characterized 
Congress as an ineffective intervener in the patent system17 or have 
attempted to discourage such interaction in the future.18  In fact, 
not only have the past two decades witnessed continuous 
legislative involvement with respect to patents, this interaction is 
the most defining feature of this era.  Whether acting in its 
oversight capacity with respect to the USPTO or introducing 
changes to the Patent Act, every Congress over the past two 
decades—from the 102nd Congress that convened in 1992 to the 
112th Congress of 2012—has impacted the patent law. 
Two legislative enactments were most significant.  The first 
was the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA)19 that, 
as enhanced by the Intellectual Property and High Technology 
Technical Amendments Act of 2002,20 brought extraordinary and 
lasting changes to U.S. patent law.  The AIPA introduced for the 
first time in the United States pre-grant publication of pending 
 
 15 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003). 
 16 See, e.g., Patent Nonsense: An End to Frivolous Patents May Finally Be in Sight, 
ECONOMIST, (last visited Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
15479680?story_id=15479680. 
 17 See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 51, 52 (2010). 
 18 See, e.g. William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving 
Target: The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 199 (2009). 
 19 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501. 
 20 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). 
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applications,21 provisional rights,22 and prior user rights.23  The 
establishment of inter partes reexamination24 was a harbinger of 
the opposition-like post-grant processes soon to come. 
The AIPA also introduced the concept of a patent term 
guarantee.25  Under this system, administrative delays in awarding 
a patent may result in an extension of its term.26  One study 
estimates that an astounding eighty percent of patents receive term 
extension due to USPTO delays.27  The legislation also introduced 
the “Request for Continued Examination” or RCE.28  This 
mechanism allows applicants to obtain further review of their 
applications without the need to file a continuing application or 
continued prosecution application.29  The RCE has proven 
relatively popular for applicants, in 2010 representing 
approximately thirty percent of all applications filed at the 
USPTO.30  Yet the RCE has also proven burdensome for the 
USPTO—the agency has struggled to reduce inventor reliance 
upon these applications as it attempts to reduce its inventory of 
unexamined applications.31 
More recently, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA).32  The most significant reform to U.S. patent 
law since the nineteenth century, the AIA caused the United States 
to switch to a first-to-file priority regime,33 shift to a full-fledged 
system of prior user rights,34 and severely limit the best mode 
 
 21 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006). 
 22 Id. § 154(d). 
 23 Id. § 273. 
 24 Id. §§ 311–319. 
 25 Id. § 154(b). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) Statistics, PATENTLY-O BLOG (July 27, 2011, 4:30 
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/pta.html. 
 28 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Bob Stoll, RCE Filings: The Facts, DIRECTOR’S F.: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (July 
26, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/rce_filings_the_facts. 
 31 See, e.g., Patrick A. Doody, How to Eliminate the Backlog at the Patent Office, 37 
AIPLA Q.J. 395 (2009). 
 32 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 33 Id. sec. 3, § 100, 125 Stat. at 285. 
 34 Id. sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. at 297. 
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requirement.35  The AIA also introduced post-grant review 
proceedings that are akin to the opposition proceedings found 
elsewhere36 and also adopted the global norm of assignee filing.37  
The unilateral adoption of global norms promises to reduce the 
burdens upon U.S. firms that seek patent rights abroad and gives 
the United States a stronger voice in the international intellectual 
property community. 
Along with these two pieces of landmark legislation, Congress 
has frequently introduced additional amendments to the U.S. 
Patent Act over the past two decades.  For example, 1996 
legislation limited the availability of patent protection on methods 
of medical treatment.38  Later, section 271, the core infringement 
statute, has been amended to account for pharmaceutical patent 
litigation,39 the activities of state actors,40  and the requirements of 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)  TRIPS Agreement.41  The 
CREATE Act of 2004 adjusted the law of obviousness in order to 
account for team research.42  Even more recently, the omnibus 
health care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, changed the Patent Act with respect to 
biologics.43  All told, the current U.S. Patent Act is a far more 
complex and nuanced statute than it was two decades ago. 
Finally, even where expressions of congressional interest did 
not lead to actual changes to the Patent Act, they often had an 
extraordinary influence upon judicial developments.  Over the past 
decade, developments in U.S. patent law have followed an unusual 
two step-procedure beginning with, the airing of considerable 
industry concerns during a congressional hearing, followed by, the 
 
 35 Id. sec. 15, § 282, 125 Stat. at 328. 
 36 Id. sec. 6, §§ 321–329, 125 Stat. at 305. 
 37 Id. sec. 4, § 118, 125 Stat. at 296. 
 38 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 616, § 287, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67–3009-68 (1996). 
 39 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 40 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 
106 Stat. 4230 (1992). 
 41 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
 42 Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-453, sec. 2, § 103, 118 Stat. 3596. 
 43 Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 7002(l), § 262, 124 Stat. 119, 80821 (2010).  
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issuance of a judicial opinion some months later that endeavors to 
address those concerns.  For example, legislative proposals to alter 
the concerning injunctive relief, venue, damages, willful patent 
infringement, and extraterritorial protection preceded the judicial 
opinions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,44 In re TS Tech 
USA Corp.,45 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,46 In re 
Seagate Technology,47 and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T.48  Although 
correlation does not imply causation, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit were, at the 
very least, aware of congressional interest in reforming patent law 
doctrines before the courts themselves did so. 
B. Markman 
The honor of the most important judicial ruling of the past two 
decades must go to the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision, Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.49  There the Court confirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s earlier holding that claim construction constituted 
a question of law reserved to the courts.50  For contemporary 
readers of these two opinions, it is not hard to see that if the 
participating jurists fully realized the implications of this 
seemingly straightforward conclusion, they did not say so–for 
Markman forever altered the patent litigation process in the United 
States.51 
In the post-Markman era, claim construction hearings where 
the trial judge determines the meaning of claim language, have 
become a fixture of patent infringement lawsuits.52  Judicial 
construction of patent claims was intended to provide numerous 
benefits, including increasing the certainty of the scope of patent 
 
 44 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (addressing the issue of awarding permanent injunctive relief to 
plaintiffs). 
 45 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (addressing the issue of venue transfers). 
 46 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (addressing the issue of damages). 
 47 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (addressing the issue of willful 
infringement). 
48  550 U.S. 437 (2007) (addressing the issue of the territorial extent of patent rights). 
 49 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 50 Id. at 390–91.  
 51 See Edmund J. Sease, Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 99, 102 (2004). 
 52 See id.  
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rights, encouraging settlement, and providing the Federal Circuit—
a court with elevated subject matter expertise—with the final word 
on the subject.53  In order to accommodate these hearings, popular 
patent enforcement fora have taken the creative step of 
promulgating doctrine-specific procedural rules to augment the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.54 
The jury remains out on Markman.  One particularly blunt 
jurist described the case as leading jurists to “sophistry and 
fiction”;55 whereas, to practitioners, claim construction can be seen 
as a “series of seemingly contradictory axioms and 
promulgations.”56  As well, the Federal Circuit is widely regarded 
as reversing too many claim constructions.57  Because essentially 
all other rulings in patent cases depend upon a sustainable 
interpretation of the claims—for example, whether the patented 
invention would have been obvious in view of the state of the art 
or whether the accused product infringes58—a Federal Circuit 
reversal often implies an entirely new trial on remand.59  Still, 
some level of uncertainty may be socially desirable in that highly 
certain claims may be difficult to draft and overly enforced.60  
More practically, the Markman process also encourages trial 
judges to become more deeply involved in patent trials.61 
The Federal Circuit has issued over one thousand opinions 
directed towards assessing the meaning of claims since Markman 
 
 53 See Jonas McDavit, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Obstacles to Using Issue 
Preclusion in a Post-Markman World, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 45, 50–54 (2006). 
 54 See Peter Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and 
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 787–88 (2010). 
 55 Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D. 
Del.1995). 
 56 Andrew B. Dzeguze, Did Markman and Philips Answer the Right Questions? A 
Review of the Fractured State of Claim Construction Law and the Potential Use of Equity 
to Unify It, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 457, 458 (2007). 
 57 See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 
1075 (2010). 
 58 See id. at 1078. 
 59 See, e.g., id. at 1087. 
 60 See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1737, 1758 (2011). 
 61 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 57, at 1083. 
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was handed down.62  Over the next two decades it seems unlikely 
that the efforts of litigants and the courts towards this subject will 
decrease.  Yet whether the collective efforts of the patent 
community can diminish the uncertainty attending claim 
construction remains to be seen. 
C. The Death of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
A defining feature of the shift from the Golden Age to the 
Silver Age has been the precipitous decline in judicial application 
of the Doctrine of Equivalents.63  Perhaps the poster child of an 
inventor-friendly patent system, the Doctrine of Equivalents was 
applied robustly by the Federal Circuit in its infancy.64  By any 
measure, however, successful use of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
has dropped dramatically over the past two decades.65  As a result, 
it appears that more so than any time in the modern history of the 
U.S. patent system, patent plaintiffs who wish to win must rely 
almost exclusively upon a theory of textual infringement.66 
Different rationales have been advanced to explain this 
phenomenon.  Some suggest that the Markman process caused 
judges who had rejected a literal infringement argument to be 
negatively disposed to equivalency as well.67  Others believe that 
the Federal Circuit was far less likely to hold a patent invalid in 
comparison to its predecessor courts; as a result, district courts 
came to rely more heavily upon infringement rulings when 
resolving disputes.68  The singular nature of the Federal Circuit 
may have also played a role.  When patent infringement appeals 
were consolidated at the Federal Circuit, that court’s jurists began 
hearing an increased number of cases involving the Doctrine of 
 
 62 Menell et al., supra note 54, at 718. 
 63 See David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) 
Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, 
On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (2010). 
 64 See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1203. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 5763, at 977–78. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114–15 (2006). 
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Equivalents.69  As they gained more experience over a period of 
years, repeated assertions that particular claim wordings covered 
distinct accused infringements may have simply become less 
compelling.70  After all, just how many times can a claimed 
manual product cover an automatic device; a mechanical switch be 
akin to an electrical one; and a resilient component serve as an 
equivalent to a malleable part?  Familiarity may have bred 
contempt. 
To some, the fall of the Doctrine of Equivalents may be a 
salutatory development.71  After all, each inventor may obtain as 
many claims as he is willing to pay for.  He may even seek to 
reissue a patent where his initial claim drafting efforts proved 
insufficient.72  But to others, a robust Doctrine of Equivalents 
allows “inventors to procure a small number of broadly 
constructed patent claims.”73  Perhaps one contributing factor to 
the enormous increase in the number of patent filings at the 
USPTO is the judicial desire for precision claim drafting rather 
than resort to theories of nontextual infringement.74  Given that the 
patent system is one in which many enter, but few leave with 
valuable intellectual property rights, whether society as a whole—
and the USPTO in particular—is best served by a cabined Doctrine 
of Equivalents remains an open question.75 
D. State Street Bank 
The past twenty years have witnessed the spectacular rise and 
fall of U.S. patents on such post-industrial inventions as business 
methods and tax strategies.  Surely the high-water mark of 
protectionism was the 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust 
 
 69 Id. at 113–14. 
 70 Id. at 114. 
 71 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming 
the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1163–64 (2004). 
 72 35 U.S.C. § 251. 
 73 John R. Thomas, The Story of Graver Tank v. Linde: Intellectual Property 
Infringement in Flux, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 298, 325 (Jane C. Ginsburg & 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 326. 
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Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.76  The Federal Circuit there 
rejected the “ill-conceived” business methods exception to 
patentable subject matter.77  The Court of Appeals further held that 
a data-processing system for implementing an investment structure 
consisted of patentable subject matter because it claimed not 
merely an abstract idea, but rather a programmed machine that 
produced “a useful, concrete and tangible result.”78 
Following the issuance of the lenient standard of State Street 
Bank, the entire range of human endeavor appeared to constitute 
patentable subject matter.  Patents issued on such diverse 
inventions as tax avoidance schemes,79 sports methods,80 insurance 
techniques,81 and marketing strategies.82  Identifying a newly 
issued patent from an improbable discipline became a common 
parlor trick in the intellectual property industry.  After all, who can 
forget patents on products and processes for character 
assessment,83 generating dinner party conversation,84 promoting 
understanding among couples,85 exercising a cat,86 or swinging on 
a swing?87 
The controversial legal principles promulgated in State Street 
Bank have for the most part been repudiated.  The Supreme Court 
opinion in Bilski v. Kappos expressly rejected State Street Bank’s 
holding that anything useful could potentially be patented.88  The 
Court’s more recent opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus also 
emphasized the significance of patentable subject matter doctrines 
within the patent system.89  Congress has also become involved, 
 
 76 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 77 Id. at 1375. 
 78 Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 79 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,716,104 (filed Mar. 4, 2005). 
 80 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,066,848 (filed May 6, 2004). 
 81 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,966,693 (filed May 7, 1996). 
 82 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,234,514 (filed July 12, 2008). 
 83 U.S. Patent No. 5,190,458 (filed Apr. 17,1991). 
 84 U.S. Patent No. 6,464,222 (filed Mar. 21, 2000). 
 85 U.S. Patent No. 6,631,904 (filed Mar. 21, 2001). 
 86 U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993). 
 87 U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000). 
 88 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
 89 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1304 (2012). 
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legislatively eliminating patents on human organisms90 and 
severely limiting patents on tax strategies91 through the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act. 
For the U.S. patent system, State Street Bank was an 
experiment that yielded dubious results.  The world has seen little 
evidence of improved innovation in business methods, finance, tax 
strategies, the social sciences, and other disciplines that for a 
decade or so were broadly patentable.92  A more certain legacy of 
State Street Bank will include an increase in USPTO workload and 
a growth in deep-seated concern about the integrity of the patent 
system.93  As innovation continually redefines existing fields of 
endeavor and establishes new ones, this experience suggests the 
wisdom of expanding the patent system with both caution and 
input from impacted industry. 
E. The BlackBerry Case 
Each generation may be assigned a leading case that draws 
public attention to the patent system not because it develops new 
legal principles, but rather for its ambition and impact upon 
everyday lives.  For an older cohort, that case was probably 
Polaroid v. Kodak.94  That litigation resulted in a damages award 
of $873 million95 and ultimately caused Kodak to abandon the 
instant camera business altogether.96  Polaroid v. Kodak conveyed 
a forceful message to innovators and investors about the value of 
U.S. patent rights as defined by the Federal Circuit. 
 
 90 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 
(2011). 
 91 Id. § 14, 125 Stat. at 327–28. 
 92 See, e.g., Stefania Fusco, Is the Use of Patents Promoting the Creation of New Types 
of Securities?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 243 (2009) (describing 
that the rate of innovation for securities has remained constant). 
 93 See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L. J. 470, 535–32 (2011). 
 94 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 95 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civ.A. No. 76-1634-MA., 1991 WL 4087, at 
*5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991). 
 96  Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 593 
(1994). 
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Over the past twenty years, the leading piece of litigation is 
arguably NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.,97 better known as 
the BlackBerry case.  A jury had found Research In Motion (RIM) 
guilty of willful infringement of NTP’s patents concerning wireless 
e-mail communication services, a judgment affirmed by the 
Federal Circuit.98  As a result, a vast number of BlackBerry users 
in the United States faced the unsettling prospect of an imminent 
cessation of service pursuant to a court-ordered injunction.99  
However, prior to the district court’s decision on issuing a 
permanent injunction, NTP and RIM signed a $612.5 million 
licensing and settlement agreement.100  The settlement ended the 
litigation and ensured uninterrupted operation of the BlackBerry 
service.101 
The BlackBerry case sent a number of potent signals.  The case 
was litigated on a contingency basis, resulting in a lucrative payout 
for NTP’s counsel and encouraging this controversial practice 
going forward.102  The Federal Circuit also held that NTP’s U.S. 
patents could to some degree cover activity performed in 
Canada.103  The recognition that U.S. patent rights could reach 
abroad, despite the absence of a specific Patent Act provision 
authorizing extraterritorial coverage, suggests the self-recognition 
of the U.S. system within an international patent order. 
This litigation also introduced to a broader community the 
concept of patent trolling and the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” 
that upon a finding of infringement, a court should issue a 
permanent injunction against adjudicated infringers.104  NTP 
provided no mobile e-mail service of its own; indeed, it marketed 
 
 97 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 98 Id. at 1325–26. 
 99 Mark Heinzl & Amol Sharma, RIM to Pay NTP $612.5 Million To Settle Blackberry 
Patent Suit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at A1. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 250 (2009). 
 103 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317(referring to NTP’s method’s claims, which has a different 
“use” analysis than those for a system or device). 
 104 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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no products or services whatsoever.105  Yet under prevailing legal 
principles NTP could control public access to the fabulously 
popular BlackBerry products and services.106  Although RIM 
averted an injunction through a costly settlement, NTP’s success 
undoubtedly inspired a growing number of non-practicing patent 
owners to seek to monetize their intellectual property entities 
through licensing and litigation. 
More impactful than any academic study, the BlackBerry 
litigation suggested to many that the patent system was out of 
alignment with mainstream legal concepts and the needs of the 
high technology community.107  Little wonder then that the 
Supreme Court became increasingly interested in the patent system 
about the time of the BlackBerry case, and that the harbingers of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act began to reach the floor of 
the House of Representatives.108  The BlackBerry case inspired 
significant changes to the U.S. patent system, ones that we are still 
working through in 2012. 
F. New Voices 
Two decades ago, discussion of the patent system was arguably 
limited almost exclusively to the patent bar.  The study of patent 
law was confined to an isolated corner of the legal academy, few 
individuals who were not admitted to practice before the USPTO 
knew much about patents at all, and most law firms engaged in 
patent practice did little else.109  The primary venue for organized 
discussion of the field was the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA), the national bar association for patent 
 
 105 See Jennifer Lane, NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.: Inventions are Global, 
But Politics are Still Local—An Examination of the BlackBerry Case, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 59, 65 n.50 (2006). 
 106 See Heinzl & Sharma, supra note 99. 
 107 See Gerard N. Magliocca, BlackBerries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils 
of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007). 
 108 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform 
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 
111th Cong. (2009). 
 109 Cf. Sam Favate, Law Students, Get Thee to a Patent Law Class, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/17/law-students-get-
thee-to-a-patent-law-class/ (encouraging law students to pursue a career as a patent 
lawyer, given the potential demand from the business world).  
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lawyers.  Yet this discussion was less in the nature of debate than 
of reaffirmation of existing views.  Most of those who did think 
about patent law in 1992 saw things the same way—namely, that 
more robust patent rights were not only in their own professional 
interest, but also in the national interest. 
Today new voices wield influence within the patent system.  
The National Academies and Federal Trade Commission issued 
influential reports that helped shape the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act.110  Lobbying groups with such Orwellian names as the 
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform,111 Coalition for Patent 
Fairness,112 and Innovation Alliance113 also influenced the text of 
the legislation and its current implementation at the USPTO.114  
And thanks to the Bayh-Dole Act,115 the university community 
also asserts its perceived interests in patent matters, particularly 
through the Association of University Technology Managers.116 
The practice of patent law has also been dramatically 
transformed over the past two decades.  For most of their history, 
U.S. patent professionals operated within a more collegial, unified 
bar that lacked the natural divisions found among antitrust, labor, 
and other sorts of lawyers.  Of late, however, the patent bar 
appears to be far more fractured.  Patent lawyers representing 
pharmaceutical firms have in recent years expressed vehement 
disagreement with those working for electronics and consumer 
 
 110 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. 
Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY (Oct. 2003). 
 111 THE COALITION FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM, http://www.patentsmatter.com 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
 112 COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org (last visited Sept. 6, 
2012). 
 113 INNOVATION ALLIANCE, http://www.innovationalliance.net (last visited Sept. 6, 
2012). 
 114 Letter from Mass Industry to Speaker John Boehner and Democratic Leader Nancy 
Pelosi (June 13, 2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform% 
20PDFS/Mass%20Industry.pdf (supporting the America Invents Act). 
 115 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. 
 116 See Todd Sherer, Preview: AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey: FY2011, BIOTECHNOW 
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.biotech-now.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2012 /08/ 
preview-autm-u-s-licensing-surveyfy2011. 
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device providers.  In-house counsel have clashed with law firms.  
Moreover, patent lawyers have increasingly joined general practice 
firms following the collapse of venerable specialty firms such as 
Darby & Darby, Fish & Neave, and Pennie & Edmonds—a  trend 
that has arguably increased the mainstreaming of patent law.117 
The number and diversity of academics with interests in patent 
law has also exploded over the past twenty years in the United 
States.  Once an obscure specialty that lived a marginal life among 
the professorate, patent law is now taught in the majority of the 
nation’s law schools and is the subject of numerous articles in 
leading law reviews each year.  Scholarship continues to inform 
and enrich our understanding of the patent regime, a welcome 
development for what was once one of the most under-theorized of 
legal disciplines. 
II. THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 
The past two decades saw a number of surprising 
developments.  In 1992, few had predicted that business method 
patents would be a focus of judicial and congressional scrutiny, 
that Markman hearings were on the horizon, or that Congress 
would alter such fundamentals as a seventeen-year term, first-to-
invent priority principle, and best mode requirement.  This history 
suggests that forecasting key moments of the next twenty years 
constitutes at best a precarious proposition.  This Article 
nonetheless explores themes that may come to dominate the 
discussion at the next twenty Fordham International Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy Conferences. 
A. The Rise of Regulatory Exclusivities 
As suggested by the phrase “patent medicine,” patents have 
long played a leading role within the intensely science-based 
pharmaceutical industry.118  That role seems destined to decrease 
 
 117 Elie Mystal, Nationwide Dissolution Watch: Darby & Darby Going Down, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Mar. 12, 2010, 9:34 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/nationwide-
dissolution-watch-darby-darby-going-down/. 
 118 Patent medicines were “preparations that often contained ingredients such as opium 
and alcohol and claimed to cure many if not all diseases.” Patent Medicines, DRUGSTORE 
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over the next two decades.  The reason is that a new intellectual 
property right, regulatory exclusivities, is poised to become the 
primary source of exclusivity for health-based inventions including 
small-molecule pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biologics. 
As originally structured by the Orphan Drug Act119 and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act,120 regulatory exclusivities were relatively 
short-term rights that supplemented the patent system.  Orphan 
drugs were afforded seven years of relatively limited regulatory 
exclusivity for diseases and conditions affecting fewer than 
200,000 patients in the United States.121  New chemical entities not 
previously approved by the FDA receive five years of 
protection,122but  if the FDA requires a clinical trial with respect to 
a product that does qualify as a new chemical entity, then three 
years of protection are provided.123  The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) Modernization Act of 1997 then augmented 
these terms by six months as a reward for conducting pediatric 
trials of drugs.124 
More recent legislation has expanded these exclusivities in 
terms of scope and duration.  Congress recently provided for 
twelve years of regulatory exclusivity for biologics.125  And some 
have noted that the analogous European regime provides for eight 
years of exclusivity before authorization for a generic may be 
submitted and two further years before it may be approved.126  
These dates are augmented by an additional year if the sponsor 
obtains further authorization for one or more new therapeutic 
indications for the product.127  It takes little imagination to assert 
that the regulatory exclusivity periods for small-molecule 
 
MUSEUM (last visited Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.drugstoremuseum.com/sections/ level_ 
info2.php?level=3&level_id=26. 
 119 Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983). 
 120 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585. 
 121 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2002). 
 122 Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2010). 
 123 Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2010). 
 124 Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296. 
 125 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010).   
 126 Council Directive 2004/27, art.10, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34, 39 (EC). 
 127 Id. 
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pharmaceuticals under the Hatch-Waxman Act should be extended 
to the terms available in Europe. 
With health care forming a key political issue for the United 
States, Congress seems likely to revisit the issue of intellectual 
property rights for healthcare innovation in the near future.  Yet 
amending the Patent Act lacks convenience in comparison with 
fortifying regulatory exclusivity.  Fine-tuning the patent laws to 
meet the needs of the healthcare industry may upset the balance of 
protection and competition in other industries.  Further, the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement requires signatories to provide patent protection 
“without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”128  But TRIPS seems to prohibit discrimination in favor 
of drug patents as well as against them.  On the other hand, TRIPS 
places few restrictions upon the award of regulatory exclusivities 
by WTO members; indeed, unlike patents, they are arguably not 
even required.129 
Enhanced regulatory exclusivity offers other advantages for 
brand-name drug companies over stronger patent protection.  First, 
patents provide not so much the right to exclude but the right to try 
to exclude.130  Generic firms frequently make successful arguments 
that the brand-name firm’s patents are invalid or not infringed.131  
In contrast, regulatory exclusivity operates without the need for 
owners to bring costly and risky infringement actions, and from its 
more limited duration, regulatory exclusivity is a better temporal 
fit with the life cycle of a pharmaceutical product.132  Regulatory 
exclusivity periods typically do not begin until a product is on the 
market, while some of a patent’s term may run before that time.133 
 
 128 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
 129 Id. at art. 39. 
 130 See Sheila Kadura, Is An Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to 
Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical 
Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 654 (2008). 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351–53 (2007). 
 133 Id. at. 351–52. 
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The proposed Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics 
Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act, or MODDERN 
Cures Act,134 provides an example of a framework of innovation 
incentives that emphasizes regulatory exclusivity over patents.  
Under that proposed legislation, the drug sponsor must identify a 
therapy that fulfills an “unmet medical need” to the FDA.135  As 
part of this identification, the sponsor indicates the patents 
associated with that “dormant therapy” and asserts that they will 
provide fourteen or fewer years of effective protection.136  The 
sponsor also files a waiver of those rights.137  If the FDA agrees 
with the sponsor and ultimately grants marketing approval, then 
the sponsor obtains fifteen years of marketing exclusivity.138  All 
of the identified patents are given an extended term of up to fifteen 
years after the product is approved.139  Any term after the fifteen 
years is then disclaimed via the voluntary waiver.140  It remains to 
be seen how much traction the MODDERN Cures Act will see in 
Congress, but the legislation provides a significant paradigm shift 
for patents and regulatory exclusivities—one that might come to 
dominate the innovative healthcare industry over the next twenty 
years. 
B. The Changing Nature of National Treatment 
The hollowed principle of national treatment forms the core 
paradigm of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention).141  The Paris Convention in turn has 
long served as the foundational international agreement underlying 
the global patent order.142  Yet national treatment will likely 
 
 134 H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 135 Id. § 201(a)(2)(A). 
 136 Id. § 201(d). 
 137 Id. § 201(b)(3). 
 138 Id. § 202(a)(1). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature 
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 
305.   
 142 See Understanding Industrial Property, WIPO 1, 4–7, (Pub. No. 895(E)), 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/895/wipo_pub_895.pdf.  
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undergo a significant, softening transformation in coming years, 
motivated by the extraordinary popularity of the patent system. 
Today virtually every national patent office faces a large 
inventory of unexamined patent applications.143  The USPTO in 
particular has engaged in several creative responses in order to 
address its backlog.144  One reaction that seems to have staying 
power is the agency’s bid to privilege domestic customers.  Under 
the new “Three-Track Proposal,”145 foreign applicants will be 
effectively required to obtain a patent in their homeland before the 
USPTO will consider their domestic applications.146  The USPTO 
will then provide what is effectively an expedited review of those 
applications based in part upon examination tasks previously 
performed abroad. 
This system comports with the principle of national treatment 
only through a clever sleight of hand.  Preferred treatment is not 
afforded to U.S. nationals per se; rather, it is given to those who 
filed in the USPTO first, regardless of their nationality.147  
However, because a firm’s home market is typically its most 
important, filing in one’s own patent office first is the current 
norm.  Whether the Three-Track Proposal will influence traditional 
international filing practice, pushing more foreigners to file first at 
the USPTO, remains to be seen. 
An international patent regime centered upon the office of first 
filing is likely not the sort of high-minded collaboration that 
optimistic supporters of patent worksharing envisioned.148  Yet this 
system would amount to cooperation of a sort.  And given the 
crushing workloads faced by patent offices around the world, the 
decline of the national treatment principle proposed by the USPTO 
seems inevitable. 
 
 143 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT 
ADMINISTRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY (2011). 
 144 Id. 
 145 David Kappos, The Three-Track Proposal: Putting Applicants in Control of 
Examination Timing, DIRECTOR’S F.: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG, (June 15, 2010, 1:14 
PM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_three_track_proposal_putting. 
 146 See Thomas, supra note 143, at 11–12.  
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. at 9. 
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C. Parallel Importation 
The high and growing costs of health care in the United States 
suggest that the parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals 
will again be the subject of serious discussion.  Members of 
Congress are well aware that prescription drugs often cost more in 
the United States than in other countries.  In order to realize cost 
savings, many individuals import medications from abroad—but in 
doing so they commit a patent infringement under current Federal 
Circuit case law.149  Congress appears virtually certain to alter this 
state of affairs in coming years, assuming that the Supreme Court 
does not act first. 
In the 112th Congress, Senate Bill 319, the Pharmaceutical 
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2011 would expressly 
allow for the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.150  Most of 
the bill is directed towards amendments to food and drug law, but 
the legislation also accounts for the patent implications of parallel 
importation.151  In particular, section 4(d) of Senate Bill 319 would 
amend the Patent Act to provide that importation into the United 
States a drug that was first sold abroad by or under authority of the 
owner or licensee of such patent does not constitute a patent 
infringement.152  The effect of Senate Bill 319 would be to 
incorporate into the U.S. Patent Act, at least on a pharmaceutical-
specific basis, a doctrine known as “international exhaustion.”153  
Although this bill appears to have little chance of enactment in 
2012, it provides a glimpse into a likely future addition to the 
Patent Act. 
The courts may beat Congress to the punch, at least with 
respect to the notion of international exhaustion.  On April 16, 
2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng v. 
 
 149 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (describing parallel patent infringement in the context of a camera lens). 
 150 S. 319, 112th Cong. § 4(d) (2011). 
 151 See Id.   
 152 Id. § 4(d). 
 153 See id.; See also Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The 
WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 333, 340–42 (2000) (describing the difference between national and international 
exhaustion). 
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John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,154 a parallel importation case involving 
copyrights.  The question presented to the Court is: 
How do Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, 
which prohibits the importation of a work without 
the authority of the copyright’s owner, and Section 
109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the 
owner of a copy “lawfully made under this title” to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the 
copyright owner’s permission, apply to a copy that 
was made and legally acquired abroad and then 
imported into the United States?155 
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Copyright Act’s reference 
to works “lawfully made under this title” means “lawfully made in 
the United States.”156  Under this view, U.S. copyright law adopts 
a “domestic exhaustion” principle under which the parallel 
importation of a protected work of authorship constitutes a 
copyright infringement.157  An equally plausible ruling is that the 
phrase “lawfully made under this title” means merely that the 
manufacture of the work was authorized by the U.S. copyright 
holder—even if the manufacturing took place outside the United 
States.158  Under this view, U.S. copyright law would adopt an 
“international exhaustion” principle under which the parallel 
importation of legitimate gray market goods does not constitute an 
infringement.159 
The Court’s ruling in Kirtsaeng is of great moment to the 
patent system.  Congress has not yet stipulated the exhaustion 
principles pertinent to patent law.  But the Federal Circuit has 
followed the first line of reasoning above to conclude that the U.S. 
 
 154 132 S. Ct. 1905 (Apr. 16, 2012). 
 155 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2013). 
 156 See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 157 See Chiappetta, supra note 153, at 340–42 (using the term “national exhaustion” 
instead of “domestic exhaustion”). 
 158 See Alexander B. Pope, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S 
Copyright Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 203–04 (2011). 
 159 See id. at 205–08. 
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patent system does not accept international exhaustion.160  Should 
the Court rule differently in Kirtsaeng, the Federal Circuit case law 
would likely be viewed as overturned as well. 
Through one mechanism or the other, the next two decades will 
likely see the abrupt introduction of international exhaustion into 
the U.S. patent system, at least with respect to pharmaceuticals.  
As a result, current experience with respect to the free movement 
of patented goods in the European Union provides a likely 
precursor to U.S. patent regime of the future.  As a voluminous 
literature has already been realized,161 the impact of this change 
upon orderly markets, patient safety, and innovation incentives in 
the United States would be profound. 
D. Future Legislation 
When President Obama signed the AIA into law on September 
16, 2011,162 some may have supposed that Congress would be out 
of the patent business for quite some time.  After all, the new law 
had a long pendency of many years on the Hill.163  Further, the 
most recent predecessor legislation dealing with multiple patent 
principles, the AIPA, had been enacted in 1999.164  These factors 
may suggest either that Congress passes any sort of patent bill only 
with considerable difficulty, or alternatively that Congress does not 
act rashly with respect to patent reform. 
Still other factors suggest that Congress remains keenly 
interested in patent matters and is likely to again intervene sooner, 
rather than later in the field.  Members of Congress and their staff 
 
 160 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
 161 See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1087 (2011); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to 
Disagree:  The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and A Few Other Things, 21 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 362 (2000) (balancing private incentives and public access for 
patents); Robert A. Paul, Black and White:  A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law 
and Gray Market Goods, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2012) 
(discussing negative economic effects of job loss and increased costs).  
 162  Richard Maulsby, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, INVENTORSEYE, 
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/ eye/201110/ 
americainventsact.jsp. 
 163 See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 626 (2012). 
 164 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). 
C06_THOMAS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  3:26 PM 
548 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:525 
have climbed a steep learning curve to develop expertise in a 
sophisticated field, suggesting greater receptivity to difficult patent 
concepts that may not have attracted legislative interest in previous 
years.  The grandly named patent lobbying groups, such as the 
Coalition for Patent Fairness and the Coalition for 21st Century 
Patent Reform, continue to exist and remain active on the Hill.165  
Moreover, patent matters frequently brush up against issues of 
more central congressional concern, in particular health care. 
Further, while the AIA is the lengthiest piece of patent 
legislation ever enacted in the United States,166 it was by no means 
a comprehensive patent bill.  A comparison of early drafts of the 
legislation with the new law reveals that many contentious issues 
remain left on the table.  Among them was a proposed shift to 
ecumenical pre-grant publication of pending applications, changes 
to the law of inequitable conduct, venue reform, and significant 
alterations to the rules governing the award of damages.167  Recent 
judicial opinions have addressed some of these issues, but 
unsurprisingly they have not addressed the concerns of all 
stakeholders.168 
At a minimum, in the near future we can surely expect the 
introduction of a “technical amendments” bill that tinkers with 
some of the provisions of the AIA once the bar and USPTO have 
had time fully to digest it.  As suggested by such legislation 
 
 165 See Amanda Becker, Patent Reform Measure Ignited Fierce Lobbying Effort, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 27, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/capital_business/ 
patent-reform-measure-ignited-fierce-lobbying-effort/2011/03/25/AFzD9VkB_ 
story.html. 
 166 Robert A. Armitage, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Will It Be Nation’s Most 
Significant Patent Act Since 1790?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, SEPT. 23, 2011, at 1, 
available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/09-23-11 
Armitage_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.   
 167 See, e.g., America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 18(d) (2011) (discussing 
proposed patent venue infringement actions); America Invents Act:  Hearing on H.R. 
1249 Before the Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statements of Secretary Kappos 
supporting removal of changes to damages venue considerations from bill and 
Congresswoman Lofgren supporting “more work” on the inequitable conduct provisions 
and the one-year grace period for publication of applications). 
 168 John R. Thomas, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Recent 
Developments in Patent Administration: Implications for Innovation Policy (July 28, 
2011). 
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subsequent to the AIPA—the Intellectual Property and High 
Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002169—this bill may 
itself include significant changes that belie its modest title.  In sum, 
an increasingly complex Patent Act was a hallmark of the past two 
decades, a trend that should continue going forward. 
E. USPTO Rule-Making Authority 
For most of its long history the USPTO has been a relatively 
sleepy agency that played a minor role in intellectual property 
policy matters.  For an entity that issued each U.S. patent, the 
USPTO actually played a relatively minor role even within in the 
patent system.  Innovation policy matters were dealt with by 
Congress and the courts.170  The position of the head of the agency 
was something of a sinecure; other elite personnel were viewed as 
something of a clannish and insular group that was insensitive to 
concerns of patent applicants.171 
This view of the USPTO, already outmoded, is likely to 
become wholly archaic over the next two decades.  The agency has 
become increasingly innovative as it has launched an array of 
programs and initiatives that have been successful in reducing its 
backlog of filed but unexamined applications.172  It has been 
praised for the transparency of its decision-making processes.173  It 
has attracted new staff with exceptional professional 
backgrounds.174  And by opening a branch office in Detroit, to be 
followed by others in locations distant from Alexandria, 
 
 169 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002). 
 170 WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41638, PATENT 
REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES (2011).  
 171 See generally id. at 5.  
 172 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41995, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
PATENT ADMINISTRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY 7–8 (2011).  
 173 Implementation of Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Hearing Before the H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Robert A. Armitage, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly and Company).  
 174 See, e.g., USTPO Leadership, USTPO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/about/bios/ 
index.jsp (last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
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Virginia,175 the agency will have an increasingly national presence.  
These branch offices should not only improve the ability of the 
agency to hire and retain quality examiners, they should also 
improve relationships with the diverse industries and user 
communities found in the United States. 
If the USPTO can continue to expand its growing reputation 
for accuracy, productivity, and resourcefulness, the congressional 
grant of rule-making authority to the agency seems a distinct 
possibility over the next two decades.  Current law provides the 
USPTO with the ability, among others, to establish regulations that 
“govern the conduct of proceedings” before it.176  However, it 
should be appreciated that “Congress has not vested the [USPTO] 
with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . .”177  Congress 
has thought seriously about expanding the agency’s authority, 
however,178 and the possibility that the USPTO will one day enjoy 
the same rulemaking ability as its peer agencies is not out of the 
question. 
This conferral of authority would cause the U.S. patent system 
to operate quite differently than it does today.179  In 2012, the 
courts engage in day-to-day governance of the U.S. patent system, 
a quite unusual, patrician regime that lacks political 
accountability.180  Under this system, the courts set, for example, 
the standard of obviousness in individual judicial proceedings; the 
agency must then follow these holdings.181  USPTO possession of 
rulemaking authority would flip this system on its head.  The 
agency would engage in rulemaking procedures to set the standard 
of obviousness with public input; the courts would then follow the 
 
 175 Press Release 12-04, USPTO, USPTO Announces Location for Elijah J. McCoy 
Satellite Office in Detroit (Jan. 11, 2012) (available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/ 
2012/12-04.jsp). 
 176 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2011).  
 177 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (1996).  
 178 For example, in the 110th Congress, H.R. 1908 would have allowed the USPTO to 
“promulgate regulations to ensure the quality and timeliness of applications and their 
examination . . . .” Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 14(a) (2007).  
 179 See, e.g., Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit 
En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733 (2011).  
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
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promulgated rule.  Whether the patent system will advance into a 
system of democratic governance over the next two decades, or 
remain under its current, sui generis regime of concentrated 
command by a handful of elites remains to be seen. 
F. Patent Aggregation 
The past few years have witnessed the accumulation of vast 
armories of patents by manufacturing firms, service providers, and 
independent aggregators alike.  Current entities such as Acacia 
Research, Round Rock Research, and RPX have quietly assembled 
large portfolios of patents both for defensive purposes and as assets 
capable of monetization.182  The largest aggregator, Intellectual 
Ventures, is believed to hold as many as 60,000 patents—a number 
that ranks fifth among patent holders based in the United States.183 
The trend towards patent aggregation will surely continue over 
the next two decades, but on an order of magnitude and level of 
sophistication that will seem staggering by the standards of 2012.  
A distinctive possibility within our lifetimes is that the top ten 
patent holders in the United States may, in combination, hold on 
the order of one-quarter of all U.S. patents—and an even higher 
percentage of commercially valuable ones.184  Finally, although the 
aggregation phenomenon is most pronounced in the United States, 
it seems likely to be heading overseas over the next twenty 
years.185 
Expanding patent aggregation holds numerous implications for 
the U.S. patent system.  First, this concentration of patents implies 
market power which, in turn, suggests the increasing mobilization 
of the antitrust law to police patent law’s excesses.  Second, savvy 
accused infringers may increasingly enlist an aggregator in order to 
identify a patent within their portfolio capable of sustaining a 
countersuit against their accusers.  This strategy, if widely 
employed, could limit the value of patents held by manufacturers 
and service providers. 
 
 182 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2012). 
 183 Id. at 24. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. 
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But on the other hand, the patent system has traditionally 
sustained fragmented proprietary rights held by diverse owners.  
This environment has contributed to the difficulties faced by 
manufacturers and service providers to determine whether patent 
rights apply to their marketplace offerings.  It has also effectively 
softened the impact of patent rights.  Proprietors would appear 
more reluctant to assert one or two patents aggressively as doing so 
might call their validity into question.  Owners of a dozen or more 
patents covering a particular technology would seem far less 
reticent.  Systematic consolidation of patent rights might 
significantly change these circumstances, suggesting possible 
changes to public perception of the patent system and to patent law 
doctrines governing transfer of patent rights and remedies law. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the first Fordham International Intellectual Property 
Conference, the U.S. patent system has changed in fundamental 
ways.  A number of defining moments have marked its transition 
from a perhaps overbold Golden Age to a Silver Age of greater 
maturity, nuance, and at times doubt.  Numerous challenges face 
the contemporary patent regime in the United States, yet most 
should agree that its current configuration better suits the global 
technology community it is designed to serve.  And even as the 
U.S. patent law has evolved, it has sustained and nurtured a range 
of technologies that could have scarcely been imagined twenty 
years ago.  So will it again, over the next two decades and beyond. 
 
 
